


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
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SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

ON THE

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM




19 Semiannual report no. 12

JANUARY 1 - JUNE 30, 1979

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION  
OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

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## Technical Report Documentation Page

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15. Abstract  The report includes an analysis of the current threat against civil aviation along with information regarding hijacking attempts, security incidents, bomb threats, and passenger screening activity. It also summarizes ongoing activities to assure adequate protection of civil air commerce against hijacking/sabotage and related crimes, and other aspects of the Civil Aviation Security Program.			
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20591



OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

December 5, 1979

Honorable Walter F. Mondale  
President of the Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed is the Federal Aviation Administration's Semiannual Report on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program covering the period January 1 to June 30, 1979. It is submitted in accordance with Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.

During this period passenger screening procedures and other safeguards implemented to prevent criminal acts against civil aviation have been highly effective. They have stood as a bulwark against the worldwide menace of aircraft piracy and related crimes.

Nevertheless, there were six U.S. air carrier hijackings during the reporting period, more than in any equivalent period since 1972. None resulted from failure of the passenger screening system. Moreover, in the 20 U.S. hijackings from January 1973 to July 1979, wherein the hijackers were processed through the passenger screening system, none of the hijackers had a real weapon or a high explosive.

From 1977 to date, 78 air carrier hijackings have taken place worldwide. The U.S. air carrier share has been steadily increasing with 5 (17 percent) of 30 in 1977, 8 (32 percent) of 25 in 1978, and 11 (48 percent) of 23 thus far this year. Initiatives have been undertaken to develop improved antihijack training and procedures intended to curtail this growing trend and to assure that all involved in a hijacking situation follow a common strategy.

Recognizing that aircraft hijackings and other criminal acts against civil aviation have continued at a high level, most nations have implemented acceptable civil aviation security programs. We will continue to provide needed technical assistance to requesting nations.


A report has also been sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sincerely,

The handwritten signature of Langhorne Bond, which is a stylized, cursive script.

Langhorne Bond  
Administrator

Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION  
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20591



OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

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Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

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
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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Langhorne Bond".

Langhorne Bond  
Administrator

Enclosure



## CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . .	1
III. INCIDENTS AND THE CURRENT THREAT . . . .	2
IV. PASSENGER SCREENING . . . . .	9
V. CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY ACTIONS . . . .	10
VI. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT . . . . .	18
VII. OUTLOOK . . . . .	19

EXHIBITS

1. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft
2. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. and Foreign Aircraft
3. Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft
4. Actual Hijackings and Prevented Attempts
5. Bomb Threats Against U.S. Aircraft and Foreign Aircraft in the United States
6. Bomb Threats Against U.S. Airports
7. The Threat to U.S. Aviation
8. Worldwide Criminal Incidents Involving Civil Aviation
9. Airline Passenger Screening Results
10. Weapon Detection Devices
11. X-Ray Baggage Inspection Systems
12. Regulatory Impact
13. Basic Policies
14. FAA-Sponsored Explosive Detection K9 Teams
15. Checked Baggage Explosives Detection
16. Foreign Technical Assistance
17. Compliance and Enforcement Actions

## I. INTRODUCTION

This is the 10th Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the U.S. Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period January 1 - June 30, 1979, and is submitted in accordance with Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.

## II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 6 U.S. airline hijackings during this reporting period were the most that occurred during any 6-month period since the initiation of strengthened U.S. civil aviation security measures in January 1973. However, none involved any failure or penetration of the security measures in place. Five did not involve actual weapons. It is noteworthy, in this regard, that of the 31 airline hijackings since January 1973, none involved real firearms or high explosives passing undetected through the screening system. Additionally, in 15 of the 20 incidents where the hijackers boarded through the normal passenger screening procedures, although claiming to have weapons or explosives, the hijackers actually had no real weapons or explosives of any type.

The vulnerability of civil aviation to terrorist action continues to be a matter of major concern both in the U.S. and internationally. The areas believed to be of greatest danger are Europe, the Middle East and Central America. Within the U.S., anti-Castro, Croatian and Serbian terrorist groups have been the most active in attempts to carry out criminal actions against civil aviation.

Worldwide hijackings of scheduled air carriers have continued at a relatively high level similar to that which has been experienced since the beginning of 1977. Ten scheduled air carrier hijacking attempts occurred worldwide during the first half of 1979. This is slightly lower than the 11 which occurred in the last half of 1978. This continuing trend demonstrates the need for continuing worldwide efforts to consistently apply effective security measures.

Firearms and other prohibited weapons continue to be intercepted in large numbers at the nation's passenger screening checkpoints. Worthy of note is the fact that none of the 31 scheduled air carrier hijacking attempts

perpetrated in the past 6-1/2 years have involved a failure of the established passenger screening procedures. While the screening procedures have proven to be highly effective, efforts continue to bring about improvements in equipment and in the efficiency of personnel.

It is expected that although criminal activity directed against the security of civil aviation will continue, the security measures in place are capable of containing the current threat.

### III. INCIDENTS AND THE THREAT

U.S. Hijackings - During this reporting period attempts to hijack U.S. aircraft continued at a high level roughly equating to the rate of attempts made during the last half of 1978. Six air carrier aircraft and no general aviation aircraft hijacking attempts were made between January 1 and June 30, 1979. This is the largest number of attempted hijackings of U.S. scheduled air carrier aircraft for any equivalent period since strengthened U.S. civil aviation security requirements went into effect in January 1973. Two of the hijacking attempts were successful. These were the first successful hijackings of U.S. scheduled air carriers since September 1976. Five of the 6 attempts were made without actual weapons. In one case the hijacker forced his way past a screening point with a knife and a can of gunpowder.

Of the 31 U.S. scheduled air carrier hijacking attempts since January 1973, none have been the result of real firearms or high explosive devices passing undetected through the screening system. In 11 of these 31 cases, the hijackers either forced their way aboard or in some other fashion avoided the normal passenger screening procedures. In 15 of the remaining 20 incidents, the hijackers, although claiming to have a deadly or dangerous weapon or high explosives, in reality had no weapons.

The following is a summary on each of the six U.S. aircraft hijackings which occurred during this reporting period:

(See Exhibits 1 & 2)

- o January 27 - A United Air Lines B-747 aircraft was hijacked en route from Los Angeles to New York by a woman claiming to have nitro-glycerin in her bag. She demanded that a message she had left at the Los Angeles Airport

be read on television. After 6 hours of negotiation she was separated from the bag which contained the alleged explosive and arrested by the FBI agent-negotiator. There were no explosives in her bag or on her person. She was charged with aircraft piracy and at last report was receiving psychiatric treatment.

- o March 16 - A Continental Airlines B-727 aircraft en route from Phoenix to Tucson, Arizona, was hijacked by a man who held his hand in his pocket and told a flight attendant that he had a "cutter." He demanded \$200,000 and indicated that he wanted to go to Cuba. Shortly after landing at Tucson, the hijacker was apprehended by FBI agents. His "cutter" was a nail file. He has been charged with aircraft piracy.
- o April 4 - A man took a woman hostage at the main concourse screening point in the Sydney, Australia, International Airport terminal. Holding a knife to her throat, he forced his way past officials and on to a nearby Pan American World Airways B-747 aircraft. He demanded flight to Moscow, USSR, via Rome, Italy. After about 1-1/2 hours the hostage was forcefully rescued by the police. The hijacker, holding a beer can with a wick, then threatened to blow up the aircraft. The police shot and killed the hijacker when he tried to ignite the beer can which was found to contain gunpowder. One policeman was injured and the hostage received minor cuts on her throat.
- o June 11 - A Delta Air Lines L-1011 aircraft en route from New York to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, was hijacked to Cuba by a male hijacker believed to have a gun and claiming that a bomb would go off in 2 hours. After landing, he was taken into custody by Cuban authorities who reportedly found a pocket knife in his jacket. No bomb or other weapons were found. He has been charged by U.S. authorities with aircraft piracy.
- o June 20 - An American Airlines B-727 aircraft was hijacked while en route from New York to Chicago when a man entered the cockpit carrying two military projectile ground burst simulators.

He also claimed to have dynamite in a bag. He demanded flight to Peru and the release of an associate from Federal custody. After landing in Chicago and after several hours of negotiations, including direct contact with his attorney, the hijacker released the passengers and flight attendants. The hijacker's associate declined to be released. The aircraft then flew to J. F. Kennedy International Airport, New York, where the hijacker and his attorney transferred to a B-707 with a new crew. They then flew to Shannon, Ireland, where the hijacker surrendered. He did not have any dynamite. The hijacker and his attorney were deported to the U.S. from Ireland as illegal immigrants on June 22. He was sentenced to 20 years on a previous conviction for transportation of explosives and conspiracy to commit murder. In addition, he has been charged with aircraft piracy and bond jumping.

- o June 30 - An Eastern Air Lines L-1011 aircraft was en route from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Miami when a man brandishing a bottle of rum and shouting pro-Fidel Castro statements threatened to burn the aircraft if he was not flown to Cuba. He was overpowered by a flight attendant with the help of other crewmembers and passengers. He has been charged with unlawful interference with a crewmember.

Although no U.S. general aviation hijacking attempts were made during the reporting period, the record of U.S. general aviation hijackings has been included in this report for purposes of comparison and reference.

(See Exhibit 3)

In addition to recording actual hijacking attempts, the FAA has attempted to identify and record those incidents in which it appeared that persons intended to commit crimes against aviation but were prevented from doing so by the security procedures in effect. Four incidents of this kind occurred during this period, raising the total number of hijackings or related crimes believed prevented to 79 since 1973. The four incidents are summarized below:

(See Exhibit 4)

- o March 18 - A man carrying a fixed-blade knife walked through and alarmed a metal detector. The man refused to walk through again and attempted to arrange with another passenger to pass him the knife after he entered the secure area. This attempt was thwarted by security personnel. He subsequently surrendered the knife to law enforcement officers and was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
- o April 12 - A man who alarmed a metal detector was discovered to have a fully loaded .25 caliber pistol pinned to an inseam on a leg of his pants. Twenty-five additional rounds of ammunition were discovered in a sock hidden inside the man's pants at the waist. He was arrested and charged with carrying a firearm.
- o April 28 - A weapon was detected by x-ray at a passenger screening checkpoint. The unloaded .22 caliber revolver was concealed in a stereo speaker which was contained in a cardboard box. The man carrying the box at first claimed he did not know the gun was there, but he later admitted it was given to him by his brother to take to their father in Guadalajara. He was arrested and charged with possessing a firearm.
- o June 25 - What appeared to be a firearm was detected by x-ray in a suitcase. The male passenger who owned the suitcase agreed to it being checked further. When the inspection narrowed down to an aluminum foil-wrapped object inside an apparent film package, the passenger asked that it not be opened as there was film inside. At that point the suitcase and all contents were turned over to the supporting law enforcement officer who opened the package and found a .45 caliber automatic in a holster and two loaded clips of ammunition. The man was arrested on Federal charges of attempting to board an aircraft while carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon.

Foreign Hijackings - During the reporting period 6 attempts were made to hijack foreign aircraft. Four of these attempts were against scheduled air carriers and 2 were against general aviation aircraft. One of the air carrier hijacking attempts was successful and both of the general aviation attempts were successful. In 5 of the 6 hijackings the hijackers possessed real weapons. Additionally, in 3 of the 4 air carrier hijackings weapons were introduced through the normal passenger boarding process and would have been intercepted by effective passenger and carry-on baggage screening procedures.

(See Exhibit 2)

Airport/Aircraft Sabotage - Three significant incidents involving the use of explosive type devices occurred during this period:

- o March 25 - A bomb contained within a piece of checked baggage exploded while sitting with several other bags on a baggage cart in the Trans World Airlines (TWA) baggage makeup area at JFK. The baggage was destined for TWA Flight 17 which was scheduled to depart approximately 15 minutes after the explosion occurred. The cart and other baggage were severely damaged and four baggage handlers were injured. Omega 7, a group opposed to the Cuban regime of Fidel Castro, has claimed responsibility for the bombing.
- o April 25 - A device consisting of a clock inside a paper bag with wires running from the bag across a power switch at the tail-light cable was found in the trunk of a rental automobile parked in front of the Lakes Charles, Louisiana, Airport terminal. A note on the back of the bag said "The next one may be real." The vehicle had been returned to the rental agency by an individual who had rented it in Alexandria, Louisiana. Investigation by local police is continuing.
- o May 6 - At the Phoenix, Arizona, Airport a custodian discovered a military smoke grenade in a restroom in a wall container. The device was safely removed by police bomb specialists.

Bomb Threats - During this reporting period bomb threats against aircraft and airports increased slightly over the number made during the last 6 months of 1978. The threats led to the arrest of 34 persons on Federal or local charges.

Of the 555 bomb threats made against aircraft, 329 were considered serious as defined in Exhibit 5. Eighty-four percent (276) of the serious threats were received telephonically; the remaining 53 were directly made at screening checkpoints or other locations or were made visually or in writing. These serious threats to aircraft caused at least 181 flight delays or diversions and 251 searches, all of which resulted in some disruption of airline operations and passenger inconvenience. The threats involved 60 U.S. and foreign air carriers. Nine of the threats were considered extortion attempts.

No attempt was made to distinguish between serious and non-serious bomb threats to airports since almost all were received under circumstances that made an evaluation of this nature impractical. The 151 bomb threats received against airports resulted in 22 evacuations of airport facilities, 104 searches and some flight delays. Two were considered extortion attempts.

(See Exhibits 5, 6 & 7)

Current Threat Against Civil Aviation - The high level of hijackings and sabotage continues to threaten the lives and property of airline passengers indicating that effective and continuing civil aviation security measures remain necessary.

Civil aviation continues to be an attractive and dramatic target for individuals and organizations attempting to further their political goals. Evidence of such attraction occurred on April 16 at Brussel Airport when two Palestinian terrorists threw hand grenades at what they believed to be recently arrived El Al passengers. Sixteen persons and one terrorist were injured.

Acts of terrorism continue to pose a serious threat to civil aviation throughout the world. The greatest danger remains in Europe, the Middle East and Central America. The several terrorist groups in these areas have established contacts and coordination with each other. This has enhanced their potential for terrorist criminal acts against international targets.

Terrorist activity has been curtailed greatly in South America due primarily to successful paramilitary security operations. As a result, many leaders and members have been killed, captured or forced to flee. Many are now exiled in Europe. In the Far East, terrorist violence remained at a low level and it is estimated that this inactivity will continue.

In the United States, Anti-Fidel Castro groups continued their criminal attacks and threats against civil aviation. A bomb exploded in a piece of checked baggage in a Trans World Airlines (TWA) baggage makeup room at La Guardia Airport in New York. An anti-Castro group claiming responsibility for the bombing said it was because TWA had organized "tour" flights to Cuba. This bombing notwithstanding, however, the overall lessening of activity by anti-Castro groups noted during the last reporting period continued into the first 6 months of 1979.

Of increasing concern in the U.S. have been the Croatian and Serbian groups. These groups have participated in terrorist bombings, killings, extortions and airline hijackings. Militants of both groups appear well-versed in the use of explosives and have used them in the United States. Their dedication is such that they apparently are willing to suffer long imprisonment and even death to propagandize their cause. Two hijackings have been perpetrated by members of these groups.

The worldwide increase in hijackings, first noted in 1977, continued at a comparable level into the first half of 1979. There were a total of 10 scheduled air carrier hijackings during the period, 3 of which were successful. In comparison, 11 scheduled air carrier hijackings occurred during the last 6 months of 1978, 3 of which were successful.

While the hijacking threat persists, acts of sabotage also pose a serious and increasing threat to civil aviation. A total of 34 criminal acts occurred during the period which resulted in 60 deaths and 53 injuries. Twelve of these incidents were hijackings (10 airline, 2 general aviation); 6 were explosions (3 at airports, 1 aboard aircraft and 2 at airline offices); 5 incidents involved explosives found (4 at airports and 1 on an aircraft). There was 1 terrorist attack at an airport and 10 other incidents, including the shooting down of an Air Rhodesia aircraft by a ground-to-air missile; and shootings, hostage-takings and violent demonstrations at airports. Four of the other incidents, resulting in 9 injured persons, involved U.S. civil aviation.

Since 1974, worldwide criminal acts against civil aviation have resulted in 755 deaths and 689 injuries, with 116 deaths and 120 injuries involving U.S. civil aviation.

(See Exhibits 2, 7 & 8)

#### IV. PASSENGER SCREENING

During the 6-1/2 years since the institution of 100% airline passenger screening, the number of hijackings has consistently been less than one-third the number attempted during the immediately preceding years. While there were 2 successful U.S. airline hijackings during this reporting period, there was no compromise or failure of the passenger screening system. As a matter of fact, none of the 31 airline hijackings that occurred in the past 6-1/2 years were caused by real firearms or high explosives passing undetected through passenger screening checkpoints. These facts, coupled with the record of over 18,000 firearms detected, over 6,400 related arrests, and 79 hijackings or related crimes prevented over the same 6-1/2-year period, constitute clear evidence of the effectiveness of airline passenger screening procedures.

From January 1 to June 30, 1979, more than 285 million persons (both passengers and nonpassengers) were processed through screening checkpoints at the 426 air carrier airports currently operating nationally. A total of 990 firearms and 3 explosive devices (2 military smoke grenades and a military 20mm shell) were detected during this period. This number is very close to the 1,096 firearms detected during the last 6 months of 1978 and the 962 detected during the first 6 months of 1978. The number of handguns, long guns, and other firearms detected in relation to the total firearms detected has remained relatively consistent for the past 1-1/2 years. Of the 990 firearms detected, 831 were discovered through x-ray inspection of carry-on items, 108 by weapons detector screening of individuals and 51 by physical search of carry-on items.

(See Exhibit 9)

The equipment utilized at screening checkpoints consists primarily of walk-through weapon detectors for individuals and, at high volume stations, x-ray inspection systems for carry-on items. Walk-through weapon detectors currently in use total 1,311 and x-ray baggage inspection systems number 662. In addition, 1,200 hand-held devices are in place to back up the walk-through weapon detectors. Efforts to improve the screening equipment and to minimize passenger

inconvenience are being carried out on a continuing basis. Passenger reactions to the screening procedures continue to indicate that they are desired and expected in the interest of aviation security.

(See Exhibits 10 & 11)

During the reporting period there were 469 arrests for carriage of firearms and explosives at the screening checkpoints. This is an increase of about 10% over the average 426 arrests for these offenses which have occurred semiannually since January 1977. The 469 arrests occurred in the operations of some 25 U.S. airlines at 76 U.S. airports. Twenty-three large hub airports (e.g., Los Angeles and Chicago) accounted for 270 or 58% of the arrests and 22 medium hub airports (e.g., Memphis and Baltimore) for 114 or 24% of the arrests. The remaining 85 arrests or 18% of the total occurred at 31 small and non-hub airports (e.g., Boise and Shreveport). In 141 or 30% of the 469 arrests, the individuals involved were fined, placed in confinement and/or placed on probation. Charges were dismissed in 77 cases or 16% of the total and prosecutive action in the remaining 251 or 54% of the cases was still pending. It should be noted that of those 218 cases which have been reported as settled, 65% (141 cases as cited above) have resulted in fines or other disciplinary action.

#### V. CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY ACTIONS

The airline and airport security measures currently in effect continue to provide increased safety for airline passengers and crews as well as increased security for aircraft and airports. These measures currently involve 168 airlines operating more than 15,000 flights each day to and from almost 700 U.S. and foreign airports. In this regard over 860,000 passengers with over 1.3 million pieces of carry-on items are screened daily.

(See Exhibit 12)

The overall success of the U.S. Civil Aviation Security Program can be attributed to the cooperative and mutually supportive efforts of all concerned--airlines, airports, local communities, air travelers and the Federal Government. Work to improve the system continued during this reporting period.

(See Exhibit 13)

Airport Security - One major event during this period was the implementation of the revision of Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 107 governing airport security. Other ongoing programs which contributed significantly to airport security included the training of law enforcement officers supporting airport security programs and the explosives detection K9 team program. Highlights of these actions and programs are summarized below:

- o FAR Part 107 - This regulation was revised, effective March 29, 1979, to update and clarify airport security requirements including provisions for broadened protection of persons and property in air transportation against acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy. The revised FAR Part 107 clarifies the requirements for law enforcement support and adds standards for the training of law enforcement officers, as mandated by Congress. Additionally, the revision provides flexibility so that in certain instances law enforcement officers supporting the passenger screening system may patrol in the public areas of terminals away from the passenger screening checkpoint thereby enabling them to provide broader deterrence to criminal acts of violence while maintaining the capability of responding quickly to any need at the passenger screening checkpoint. As of June 30, 1979, FAA approved adoption of this concept at six airports.

The revised rule also contains a prohibition against unauthorized carriage of a firearm, explosive or incendiary device by persons in or entering sterile areas or presenting themselves for inspection at established passenger screening points. Prior to the revision, only the actual carriage of unauthorized weapons aboard an aircraft was prohibited by the FARs. The revised rule provides for a civil penalty of up to \$1,000 and is intended to complement existing Federal or local criminal sanctions.

- o Civil Aviation Security Training School - This school is designed primarily for local law enforcement officers assigned to support airline and airport security programs. Attendance of local officers at the 8-day course at the Transportation Safety Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, is funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The course provides indepth coverage of civil aviation security requirements, procedures and techniques. As of July 1979, 93 classes have been conducted for 2,187 students including 1,566 local police officers, 287 foreign students, 267 FAA employees, 37 representatives of other U.S. Government agencies and 25 aviation industry officials. In addition to the formal classes at Oklahoma City, special 2-day seminars, attended by 1,800 persons, have been conducted at 24 airports located at key cities across the nation.
- o Explosives Detection Dog Teams - The FAA, in cooperation with the LEAA, has sponsored a program to strategically locate Air Force-trained explosive detection dog teams in key cities near major airports. The teams are positioned so that this emergency support will be readily available to threatened aircraft flying over the U.S. within one-half hour flight time. Currently, 29 airports provide this emergency support. To date, in actual explosive detection missions, the teams have detected 25 explosive items in the course of 3,608 aircraft and airport searches. In addition, they have conducted 4,370 explosive searches in their local communities, detecting 108 additional explosive items.

During the last annual training proficiency evaluations conducted by the U.S. Air Force, the K9 teams maintained a level of detection surety of approximately 98% and a false alert rate of about 4% in this training mode. Search times averaged from 11 minutes to search a vehicle to 18 minutes to search standard size cargo areas. Average time to search an aircraft was 14 minutes.

(See Exhibit 14)

Aircraft Security - Actions in this area during the reporting period included the formation and operation of a joint industry and government screening system improvements study group, the development of improvements in crewmember training, Federal Air Marshal missions, and a change in the assignment of responsibilities and support to foreign air carriers. These actions are summarized below:

- o FAA/Aviation Industry Screening System Improvements Study Group - FAA and aviation industry representatives engaged in a joint study of possible improvements in the passenger screening system. This effort focused on both the human and the technical elements of the system. While the FAA/aviation industry recommendations in the technical area generally involve long-range actions aimed toward the improvement of equipment, the recommendations regarding the human element of the system are of a more immediate nature. Several such recommendations have already been implemented; e.g., distribution of passenger/property screening guidelines to screening and related law enforcement personnel. Also, a checklist was distributed to all screening stations to serve as a reminder of basic procedures to be followed by screening personnel.
- o Crewmember Training - The FAA has continued the debriefings of U.S. airline flight crews involved in hijackings to develop improved in-flight and ground antihijack training and procedures. Based on the results of these debriefings and related experience, the FAA undertook development of an updated flight crew training program in antihijack defensive tactics. Upon completion, this program for cockpit and cabin crewmembers will provide a high level of assurance that all involved in a hijacking situation are following a common strategy.

- o Federal Air Marshals - During this period Federal Air Marshals (Sky Marshals) participated in two missions to Georgetown, Guyana, for the purpose of assuring the protection of flights evacuating the survivors of the Peoples Temple tragedy at Jonestown, Guyana. Also, during this period the air marshals completed their annual recurrent training at the FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia. FAA maintains this small, highly-trained group of marshals to support requirements for protection of high risk flights and to provide the capability for expansion of the force should the hijack/sabotage threat against U.S. aviation increase significantly.
- o Foreign Air Carriers - Responsibility for the foreign air carrier security program, which had been centralized at FAA, Washington Headquarters, was decentralized and passed to the various FAA regions having jurisdiction over geographical areas outside the United States. This was accomplished to better serve the security needs of the foreign air carriers and to ensure the best possible communications and liaison between the FAA and the responsible security officials of the carriers.

Seventy-five foreign air carriers conducting scheduled operations to the United States are currently covered by FAR Part 129, which requires them to implement security programs similar to those used by U.S. air carriers. In addition, over 100 foreign charter operators hold permits which allow them to conduct public charter flights to the U.S. which are also covered by FAR Part 129. However, during this reporting period only 16 foreign charter operators conducted public charter flights to the United States.

Program reviews and onsite assessments of these foreign air carriers were conducted during this reporting period. With few exceptions, these carriers exhibited a positive attitude in meeting their security requirements.

Research and Development - The FAA has a comprehensive and far-reaching research and development program which constantly strives to improve the present system as well as to develop new capabilities in security equipment. The current status of those research and development efforts which have evidenced significant changes during this period is as follows:

- o X-ray Absorption - An operational test of this system conducted at Newark International Airport in 1977 demonstrated that sufficient detection capabilities existed to warrant further development. As a result, two systems are being refurbished into prototype operational systems and will be placed in a realistic operational environment at an airport to process checked baggage and to gain needed operational experience. It is planned that these two units will be used at selected U.S. airports sometime during the first half of 1980 for a 1-year operational evaluation.
- o Nuclear Magnetic Resonance - A scale model of this system was constructed and a demonstration of the feasibility of this concept was conducted in the spring of 1978. An airport evaluation to gather research and development data and determine operating characteristics was conducted in the spring of 1979. If analysis of this data indicates that this technique shows promise, additional airport tests will be scheduled.
- o Thermal Neutron Activation - The technical feasibility of this concept (identification of explosives by means of the unique nuclear reaction of the nitrogen atoms present in explosives) has been demonstrated. A current contract calls for the design and construction of a portable system which can be tested at different airports. The first tests are planned for November 1979.
- o Use of Small Animals to Detect Explosives - A 2-year contract was awarded the Veterans Administration, Philadelphia, Medical Research

Wing, to determine the potential of small animals (gerbils, rats, etc.) in detecting explosives.

(See Exhibit 15)

International Activities - Progress has been made in securing the active participation of other countries in programs designed to prevent criminal acts against civil aviation. A high percentage of the nations of the world and their airlines currently have comprehensive security programs and make continuous efforts to improve the security of their airports and their aircraft.

The following are some of the more significant activities which contributed to the improvement of international civil aviation security during this reporting period:

- o Bonn Declaration on Hijacking - In July 1978, at an Economic Summit Conference held in Bonn, Germany, President Carter and the Heads of State of six other participating nations issued a Declaration of their commitment to intensify joint efforts to combat terrorism. The Declaration announced that where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft or if the country does not return the aircraft, the seven nations would initiate action to cease all flights to that country, to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by airlines of the country concerned. A final follow-on meeting of representatives of the seven countries was held in London in May. At that meeting agreement was reached on procedural guidelines to facilitate a coordinated approach to implementation of the Declaration. Thus far, seven hijackings have met the criteria to be considered covered by the Declaration.
- o International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) - In May, ICAO held its first European Regional Security Seminar in Paris, France. Sixty-two participants from 21 states and 5 international organizations attended the meeting. These regional seminars have contributed significantly to enhancement of civil aviation security and improved cooperation between states on a regional basis.

ICAO has undertaken an extensive program in civil aviation security technical assistance to African states. Several security experts have been hired to establish and conduct training programs and to provide guidance regarding the implementation of security measures.

- o International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) - At a regional conference held in May at Quito, Ecuador, attended by representatives of all North Central and South American countries, a major topic of discussion was the prevention of crimes against civil aviation. The delegates dedicated themselves to ensuring that civil aviation security requirements were diligently carried out. They also indicated their strong support of the resolution passed at the INTERPOL General Assembly meeting in October 1978 to encourage governments to prevent the use of their territories for criminal activity related to acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation or as a refuge to avoid criminal prosecution for such acts.
- o Fourth International Conference on Terrorist Devices and Methods - In May FAA participated in the fourth International Conference on Terrorist Devices and Methods which was held near London and sponsored by the United Kingdom. Technical representatives from 32 nations participated. Presentations and discussion topics included reviews of current anti-terrorist operations as related to the use of improvised explosives and incendiary devices and the latest techniques and equipment developed to deal with them upon discovery. These conferences are believed to be of considerable value since they provide a major forum for the free and direct exchange of highly technical data between experts in the field of explosives security.
- o International Civil Aviation Security Conference - A 5-day International Civil Aviation Security Conference was hosted by the FAA at Reston, Virginia, in April. The conference was attended by some 155 delegates representing 30 foreign

air carriers, 50 foreign governments and 9 international organizations. The conference provided for the exchange of information and techniques as well as the strengthening of cooperative relationships.

- o Foreign Technical Assistance - In addition to multilateral efforts such as those described above, FAA has continued a bilateral program of technical assistance and exchange of information. FAA has responded to requests of other governments by providing technical assistance of various types including visits of security teams to requesting countries, indepth briefings of foreign officials, formal training at the Transportation Safety Institute, and distributing technical training aids and analytical studies.

(See Exhibit 16)

#### VI. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

The FAA is responsible for ensuring compliance by airlines, airports and individuals with the pertinent FARs. Alleged or apparent violations of regulatory requirements are investigated and appropriate administrative or legal actions taken.

The paramount objective is to achieve compliance with the Federal Aviation Regulations to assure safety and security for airline passengers and crewmembers. Success is primarily dependent upon the spirit of cooperation between industry personnel and the persons responsible for the enforcement of the regulations. Airlines and airport operators generally recognize potential problems and take prompt corrective action on their own initiative, thus negating potential enforcement actions.

In those instances where an investigation of an alleged violation of the regulations indicates lack of compliance, administrative or legal action may be necessary. These actions take the form of Warnings, Letters of Correction or assessment of civil penalties. During the reporting period, 303 investigations were completed involving alleged violations of FARs relating to security by U.S. and foreign air carriers and U.S. airports. In 22 of these cases, civil penalties totaling \$18,025 were imposed; 251 resulted in administrative corrective action, including 176 Warnings; and in 30 cases the alleged violation was not substantiated.

In addition, during this reporting period, 123 investigations were completed on alleged violations by individuals of FAR Sections 107.21 and 121.585. These FARs are concerned with attempting to board or boarding an aircraft with a deadly or dangerous weapon. FAR Section 121.585 violations also includes those who allegedly carried loaded firearms in checked baggage. Twenty-eight of these cases resulted in civil penalties in the amount of \$5,000; in 80 other cases the individuals were given administrative Warnings; and in 15 cases the alleged violations were not substantiated.


(See Exhibit 17)

VII. OUTLOOK

The threat of aircraft hijacking and aviation sabotage persists. It is compounded by increasing terrorist activities worldwide and the continuing resort to explosives in the commission of crimes. Aviation remains an attractive and, because of its very nature, a vulnerable target for the mentally deranged, the criminal as well as the political terrorist. The security measures in place are generally effective and provide cornerstones and basic procedures which can be expanded to counter any varied and more serious threats, by terrorists or by nonterrorists.

Department of Transportation  
Federal Aviation Administration

## HIJACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT <sup>1/</sup>



HIJACKING BY YEAR	1930 - 67	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	TOTALS
<b>TOTAL</b>	9	17	40	25	25	27	1	3	6	2	5	8	6	174
<b>SUCCESSFUL</b>	4	13	33	17	11	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	89
<b>INCOMPLETE<sup>2/</sup></b>	1	1	1	4	8	14	1	1	1	0	3	4	2	41
<b>UNSUCCESSFUL</b>	4	3	6	4	6	5	0	2	5	1	2	4	2	44


As of: 7/1/79

U.S. AIR CARRIER HIJACKING ATTEMPTS SINCE JAN. 1, 1979									
DATE	AIRLINE/FLIGHT AIRCRAFT	NUMBER ABOARD	FLIGHT ORIGIN	DESTINATION	HIJACKER DESTROYITIVE	REMARKS			
1/27/79	UA/B-747	131	Los Angeles, CA	New York, NY	New message read on television	Incomplete 1 female captured			
3/16/79	CON/2B-747	94	Los Angeles, CA	Tucson, AZ	\$200,000. Cuba	Incomplete 1 male captured			
4/4/79	PA/B100/L-747	2	Sydney, Australia	Aucklnd, Australia	Moscow, USSR via Rome Italy	Unsuccessful 1 male killed	1/ Includes commercial operators engaging in interstate common carriage covered by Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 121.7		
6/11/79	DL/106/L-1011	204	New York, NY	Ft. Lauderdale, FL	Cuba	Successful 1 male fugitive			
6/20/79	AA/2B3B-727	134	New York, NY	Chicago, IL	Prisoner release and flight to Ireland	Successful 1 male surrendered			
6/30/79	EA/B32/L-1011	306	San Juan, PR	Miami, FL	Cuba	Unsuccessful 1 male captured	2/ Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended (killed) during hijacking or a result of "hot pursuit"		

<sup>1/</sup>Includes commercial operators engaging in interstate common carriage covered by Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 121.7  
<sup>2/</sup>Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended (killed) during hijacking or a result of "hot pursuit"

Department of Transportation  
Federal Aviation Administration

## HIJACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. AND FOREIGN AIRCRAFT \*




As of 7-1-79

\* Includes General Aviation

EXHIBIT 2

## HIJACKING ATTEMPTS ON U.S. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT



CY	Prior 1968	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	TOTAL
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>35</b>
Successful	3 (100%)	5 (100%)	0	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0	1 (100%)	3 (75%)	4 (67%)	0	0	2 (40%)	22 (63%)
Incomplete <sup>1</sup>	0	0	0	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0	0	0	0	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	0	8 (23%)
Unsuccessful	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	5 (14%)

As of: 7/1/79

GENERAL AVIATION HIJACKING ATTEMPTS SINCE JANUARY 1, 1978						
DATE	AIRCRAFT	NUMBER ABOARD	ORIGIN	FLIGHT	HIJACKER	REMARKS
1/24/78	Cessna 205	2	Incident ID	None	Unsuccessful 1 male captured	
5/24/78	Bell Helicopter	2	St. Louis MO	None	Mexico	Unsuccessful 1 male captured
5/24/78	Bell Helicopter	2	St. Louis MO	None	Mexico	Incomplete 1 female alive
6/30/78	Piper Seneca	4	Panama CO	None	Marion HI	
9/13/78	Cessna 182	5	Orlando FL	None	To escape	Successful 1 male captured
12/16/78	Cessna 172	3	Riverside CA	Local	To escape	Successful 4 males 3 captured
12/16/78	Cessna 172	3	Riverside CA	Local	Camden SC	Incomplete 1 male captured

<sup>1</sup> Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended/killed during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit"

## **ACTUAL HIJACKINGS & PREVENTED ATTEMPTS (U.S. AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT)**





EXHIBIT 4


## Bomb Threats Against U.S. Aircraft and Foreign Aircraft in the U.S.



\* A statement is considered a serious threat if one of the following occurs:

1. It is directed against a particular aircraft or flight.
2. It is not possible to immediately determine if it is made in a joking manner.
3. It results in inconvenience to other passengers.
4. It results in a search or otherwise disrupts airline operations.

## Bomb Threats Against U.S. Airports



## **Civil Aviation Security The Threat To U.S. Aviation**

	1961-7	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
<b>Hijackings*</b>	12	22	40	27	27	31	2	7	12	4	6	13	6
<b>Explosions:</b>													
Aircraft	2	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	2	2	1	0	0
Airports						2	2	4	4	2	3	3	1
<b>Explosive Devices Found:</b>													
Aircraft					1	2	2	1	1	1	2	0	1
Airports					5	5	3	11	5	3	1	6	5
<b>Bomb Threats To:</b>													
Aircraft	400	601	1145	2156	1383	1453	1853	1950	1229	1032	1032	555	
Airports			212	288	239	387	449	1036	519	318	151		

\*Includes Air Carrier and General Aviation Hijackings

As of 7/1/79

## Worldwide Criminal Incidents Involving Civil Aviation

Year	Deaths	Injuries	Total Incidents	Hijackings (Scheduled Air Carriers)	
				Foreign	U.S.A.
1968*	2	2	30	13	17
1969*	35	7	92	47	40
1970	92	32	82	56	25
1971	31	9	73	31	25
1972	159	96	88	31	27
1973	104	75	73	20	1
1974	170	59	62	19	3
1975	88	162	64	13	6
1976	227	200	55	13	2
1977	129	68	69	25	5
1978	81	147	71	17	8
1979	60	53	34	4	6

As Of: 7/1/79

\* Statistical data prior to 1970 are approximations.

## **Civil Aviation Security Airline Passenger Screening Results January 1977 - June 1979**

	1977 Jan-June	1977 July-Dec	1978 Jan-June	1978 July-Dec	1979 Jan-June
<b>Persons Screened (Millions)</b>	243.1	265.7	275.2	304.5	285.7
<b>Weapons Detected</b>					
<b>Firearms</b>	874	1160	962	1096	990
(1) Handguns	745	985	836	991	902
(2) Long Guns	24	40	34	33	29
(3) Other	105	135	92	72	59
<b>Explosive/Incendiary Devices</b>	2	3	1	2	3
<b>Persons Arrested</b>					
<b>For Carriage of Firearms/Explosives</b>	370	440	404	492	469
<b>For Giving False Information</b>	23	21	31	33	21
<b>Other Offenses Detected</b>					
<b>Narcotics</b>	156	126	151	98	73
<b>Illegal Aliens</b>	474	483	723	605	845
<b>Other</b>	151	242	706	68	40

Source: Monthly Reports Of Passenger Screening Activities At U.S. Airports

As of 7/1/79

## **CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY WEAPON DETECTION DEVICES**

Type	Basic Characteristics	Manufacturer	Units
Walk-Thru Active	Creates and Measures Deviations in Own Electric Field. Detects Both Ferrous and Non- Ferrous Metals.	Rens Infinetics Metor Westinghouse Sperry Rand Solco Sentry Philips	645 326 77 28 11 21 199 4
			Total 1311
Hand-Held Active	Comparable To Walk- Thru Active. Limited Effective Range.	Rens Federal Solco	230 250 720
			Total 1200

**Total — All Types — 2511**

As Of: 7/1/79

## CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY X-RAY BAGGAGE INSPECTION SYSTEMS

Characteristics: Small Dose X-Ray, Intensify Image Electronically, Display on TV

Operating Criteria: Meet FDA / BRH and State Health Standards  
Distinguish 24 Gauge Wire

Limitations: Dependent on Diligence of Operators, Demands Constant Attention and Ability to Quickly Recognize Dangerous Articles

<u>Systems In Use:</u>	322
Phillips Electronic Instruments	115
Bendix	110
American Science & Engineering	56
New Security Concepts	34
Dennis & Miller	25
<b>Total:</b>	<b>662</b>

As of 7/1/79

## CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY REGULATORY IMPACT

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>FOREIGN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Carriers	77*	91**	168
Airports	426	270	696
Aircraft	2,740	—	—
Flights Per Day	14,800	570	15,370
Passengers Per Day	824,000	45,000	869,000
Carry-On Items Per Day	1,236,000	67,500	1,303,500

\* Includes 41 Scheduled Air Carriers and 36 Commuter Airlines Which Operate Under Approved Security Programs


\*\* Includes 75 Scheduled and 16 Charter Operators

As Of: 7/1/79

## CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY BASIC POLICIES

<u>PROGRAM ELEMENT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>ACTIONS</u>
AIR CARRIERS	SECURE TRAVEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS</li><li>• SCREEN PASSENGERS, CARRY-ON ITEMS</li><li>• SECURE BAGGAGE, CARGO PROCEDURES</li><li>• PROTECT AIRCRAFT</li></ul>
AIRPORTS	SECURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS</li><li>• PROTECT AIR OPERATIONS AREA</li><li>• PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT</li></ul>
FAA	LEADERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE THREAT</li><li>• PRESCRIBE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS</li><li>• COORDINATE SECURITY OPERATIONS</li><li>• PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE</li><li>• ENFORCE REGULATIONS</li></ul>
USERS	PROGRAM COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• SECURITY FUNDED AS OPERATING COST OF SYSTEM</li></ul>

## FAA SPONSORED EXPLOSIVE DETECTION K9 TEAMS LOCATIONS & UTILIZATION



# **CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CHECKED BAGGAGE EXPLOSIVE DETECTION**

## **X-RAY ABSORPTION**

Two Units Being Built For Operational Testing  
Delivery Scheduled For March 1980

## **THERMAL NEUTRON ACTIVATION**

Construction of Prototype Complete  
Prototype Evaluation Scheduled For November 1979

## **NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE**

Construction of Prototype Complete  
Prototype Evaluated April 1979  
Analysis in Progress - Further Tests Contemplated

## **VAPOR CHARACTERIZATION**

Identification of Unique Vapors of Explosives  
Scheduled For Completion By November 1979

## **BIOLOGICAL**

Use of Small Mammals (Gerbils, Rats) To Detect Explosive Vapors  
Test Cages Delivered  
Animals Habituated To Laboratory  
Training to Begin Fall 1979

AS OF: 7/1/79

## **CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**

<u>ACTIONS</u>	<u>COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING</u>
• <b>FAA Technical Assistance Team Visits</b>	<b>27</b>
• <b>Aviation/Law Enforcement Officials Briefings</b>	<b>69</b>
• <b>Training Programs:</b>	
– <b>Aviation Security Course (Students)</b>	<b>69 (287)</b>
– <b>Antihijacking Tactics</b>	<b>27</b>
– <b>Ground Explosive Security</b>	<b>66</b>
– <b>Inflight Explosive Security</b>	<b>86</b>
– <b>Passenger Screening</b>	<b>18</b>
• <b>Analytical Studies Distribution</b>	<b>15</b>

**As Of: 7/1/79**

## **Civil Aviation Security Compliance and Enforcement Actions**

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
<b>U.S. Air Carriers</b>							
Warnings	—	—	329	270	276	266	134
Letters of Correction	152	124	128	110	109	145	48
Non Enforcement Actions	66	36	63	108	61	65	23
Civil Penalties (Amount)	43 (\$42,850)	58 (\$75,750)	56 (\$45,300)	84 (\$46,800)	43 (\$86,700)	30 (\$23,300)	15 (\$10,025)
Investigations Closed	261	218	576	572	489	506	221
Investigations Pending				61	48	61	64
<b>Foreign Air Carriers</b>							
Warnings		No Regulation Applicable	0	0	0	0	2
Letters of Correction			0	12	11	11	3
Non Enforcement Actions			3	2	2	3	1
Civil Penalties (Amount)			0	0	0	0	0
Investigations Closed			3	14	13	14	6
Investigations Pending				2	2	12	17
<b>Airports</b>							
Warnings Issued	—	—	125	141	137	168	40
Letters of Correction	40	68	83	68	53	65	23
Non Enforcement Actions	11	14	7	18	23	20	6
Civil Penalties (Amount)	1 (\$1,000)	14 (\$6,750)	16 (\$14,450)	19 (\$10,400)	12 (\$3,500)	11 (\$7,500)	7 (\$8,000)
Investigations Closed	52	96	231	246	223	264	76
Investigations Pending					23	29	41
<b>Individuals</b>							
Administrative Corrections		No Regulation Applicable	1	27	81	68	80
Non Enforcement Actions			2	41	24	18	15
Civil Penalties (Amount)			1 (\$25)	1 (\$35)	4 (\$2,050)	9 (\$1,925)	20 (\$5,000)
Investigations Closed			4	68	109	95	123
Investigations Pending					14	45	123
							As Of: 7/1/79

03-